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Recently, Japanese banks reported
their financial results for the fiscal year
ending in March 1999. The 17 largest
banks suffered a net combined after-
tax loss of ¥3.6 trillion ($29.51 billion
at $1 = ¥122). Moreover, even after
spending ¥10.4 trillion to dispose of
nonperforming loans in the 12 months
previously, the total nonperforming
loans at these banks stood at over ¥20.9
trillion, representing a little over 3%
of total loans of the banks. These re-
ports were the latest installment of
bleak news for a banking system that
has been in the grip of a deep and
prolonged crisis. Since the collapse
of stock and land prices in 1990, the
Japanese economy has exhibited tepid
performance, with continued declines
in asset prices and sharp increases in
business bankruptcies. Consequently,
the quality of assets at Japanese banks
has deteriorated significantly, culmi-
nating in the failure of several large in-
stitutions in 1997 and 1998. Currently,
it is estimated that the bad loans of
major banks alone total about 7% of
gross domestic product (GDP).1 This
figure far exceeds the amount of gov-
ernment resources spent, 2.5% to 3%
of GDP, to resolve the savings and loan
crisis in the U.S.
Almost from the onset of the crisis,
Japanese regulators have received most
of the blame. They have been criticized
for not controlling the level of risk in
the banking system, for not taking
prompt corrective action against poor-
ly capitalized banks, and for making
regulatory and accounting changes
that allowed economically insolvent
or nearly insolvent institutions to con-
tinue their operations.
Effective supervision and regulation
of banks is essential to a safe and
sound financial system. However, it
is increasingly recognized that super-
vision and regulation is not the only
means of controlling risk in banking
systems. Information about bank busi-
ness behavior and the resulting disci-
pline provided by market participants
can be effective tools that enhance
regulatory discipline.
Although several studies document
the efficacy of market discipline on
U.S. banks, there is skepticism about
the effectiveness of market discipline
on Japanese banks.2 It is widely argued
that the particular features of  Japanese
markets create an inhospitable envi-
ronment for effective market disci-
pline. However, recent evidence
reviewed in this article suggests that
market discipline on Japanese banks
is alive and well. Hence, reform pro-
posals aimed at improving the condi-
tion of Japanese banks should give




By demanding a higher rate of return
on debt and equity securities of riski-
er banks, market participants can pro-
vide information to regulators and
can potentially discipline bank man-
agement by penalizing banks with
higher risk. There are two prerequi-
sites for market discipline to be effec-
tive. First, market participants need
an incentive to price risk. That is, they
need to be personally exposed to po-
tential losses arising from risk. Second,
market participants need quality infor-
mation on banks’ exposures to various
types of risks to be able to judge the
overall risk of the bank.
A widespread perception is that the
regulatory, institutional, and informa-
tional structures of Japanese markets
hinder the development of effective
market discipline on banks. For in-
stance, until the mid-1980s regulators
encouraged banks to limit stock price
fluctuations in an effort to influence
the public’s perception of risk at banks.
As a result, the share prices of Japanese
banks were nearly constant for long
periods of time. When share prices
cannot respond to new information or
their response is muted, they do not
provide useful signals. Furthermore,
the “convoy system,” where all Japanese
banks move in the same general direc-
tion and the strong institutions protect
the weak ones, can also hinder market
discipline. If the protection provided
by strong institutions shields creditors
and shareholders of weak banks from
extensive losses, then market partici-
pants have little incentive to charge a
risk premium.
The institutional arrangements among
Japanese firms do not seem any more
welcoming to market discipline than
the regulatory system. There are ex-
tensive ties among Japanese firms, fos-
tered through holdings of each other’s
debt and equity and through other
business ties. Banks and other finan-
cial institutions form the nexus of
these relationships. For instance, the
major shareholders of Japanese banks
are other banks and insurance compa-
nies. Furthermore, insurance compa-
nies are among the major creditors
of banks. As a result of these links, the
long-term stakeholders at Japanese
banks may have different and more
complex exposures to losses, and
hence different incentives, than regu-
lators or individual market participants.
In such cases, the signals provided
by participants with close ties to banks
may not be useful to regulators in
assessing bank risk.
Japanese investors also have less infor-
mation on banks than investors in otherindustrial countries. For instance, it
was not until 1993 that Japanese banks
were required to report the amount of
nonperforming loans in their loan port-
folio, and it was not until March 1999
that they reported such loans by the
relatively strict standards required in
the U.S. This and the lack of other in-
formation on the asset composition and
risk of Japanese banks serve as potential
impediments to market participants’
ability to judge and price risk.
Bank failures and
shareholder responses
Despite the potential constraints
placed on market discipline by these
features of Japanese markets, evidence
indicates that market participants do
provide informative signals about risk
of Japanese banks.
In a recent study, Brewer, Genay,
Hunter, and Kaufman (1999) exam-
ine the impact of recent failures of
large financial institutions in Japan
on the share prices of surviving insti-
tutions.3 They suggest that these fail-
ures represented major changes in the
risk environment of surviving banks.
For the first time in the postwar history
of Japanese banks, the shareholders
of insolvent or weak banks suffered
losses, increasing the likelihood that
the shareholders of other weak banks
would suffer losses. If market discipline
exists, the failure announcements
should have had a negative impact on
the share prices of surviving institu-
tions. Indeed, the authors of the study
find that share prices of banks, adjusted
for market movements, declined sig-
nificantly in the days following the
failure announcements (figure 1).
Moreover, consistent with the market
discipline hypothesis, the sell-off in
bank shares was not indiscriminate.
Banks with observably higher risk
(banks with higher loan loss reserves
or nonperforming loans relative to
their equity capital, banks with a high-
er fraction of risky loans in their port-
folio, and banks with lower Moody’s
ratings) experienced larger losses in
value than others.
The significant negative reaction to
the failures is particularly interesting
because the problems at the failed
institutions were widely known prior
to their failure. In fact, as shown in
figure 2, the shareholders of the four
failed banks had already suffered sig-
nificant losses relative to shareholders
of surviving banks in the 12 months
leading up to failure. For all but one
of the failed banks, the average daily
returns (adjusted for market returns)
during this period were significantly
negative and less than the returns of
surviving banks. In fact, during the
12 months prior to the failures of
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (Takugin)
and the Long-Term Credit Bank of
Japan, Ltd., these banks had the low-
est average daily returns of all banks.
Prior to the failure of Hyogo Bank,
only two banks had lower returns than
Hyogo. Moreover, the share prices of
the failed banks were significantly
more volatile than those of other banks.
For instance, in the 12 months lead-
ing up to their failure, the standard
deviations of the daily excess returns
for Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan
and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank were
three and 1.56 times the standard de-
viation of returns for all other banks,
respectively. The behavior of stock
returns of banks prior to their failure
suggests that shareholders provided
fairly powerful signals about the condi-
tion of these institutions.
Other evidence on pricing for risk
In addition, the behavior of stock re-
turns of Japanese banks suggests that,
despite the poor quality of disclosed
information on asset quality, share-
holders price for observable measures
of risk. Figure 3 compares the one-year
holding period returns for banks with
relatively high risk to those of banks
with low risk. Banks that announced
higher loan loss reserves, more risky
loans, and lower capital ratios at the
end of a fiscal year earned signifi-
cantly lower returns over the prior 12
months.4 Simple correlations between
market-adjusted returns and these mea-
sures of risk paint a similar picture.
This evidence of market discipline
is consistent with the results of other
studies on Japanese banks. For in-
stance, Peek and Rosengren (1998)
relate the daily movements in the
“Japan premium,” the premium
charged to large Japanese banks in
the international interbank loan mar-
kets, to announcements of bank fail-
ures, regulatory policy changes, and
ratings downgrades.5 Their results
indicate that unsecured creditors of
Japanese banks demand a higher re-
turn on loans to riskier banks and the
premium changes in response to the
perceived risk faced by creditors. In-
terestingly, the authors find that the
Japan premium does not respond sig-
nificantly to announcements of policy
change by regulators, unless those
announcements are associated with
actual policy changes.
A recent article by Bremer and Pettway
(1999) examines the impact of ratings
downgrades by Moody’s on bank share
prices.6 The authors look at stock re-
turns prior to the announcement of the
downgrade, as well as returns on the
days surrounding the announcement.
1. Responses of shareholders
Notes: The average excess returns for a portfolio of
bank stocks on the day and the following two days
of the announcements of the failure of Hyogo Bank
Ltd., Hokkaido Takushoku Bank Ltd. (Takugin), the
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd. (LTCB), and
the Nippon Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd. (NCB).
Source: Elijah Brewer III, Hesna Genay, William C.
Hunter, and George G. Kaufman, 1999.







2. Average daily excess returns
*indicates the average excess returns of
surviving banks.
Notes: The average daily excess returns of failed
and surviving Japanese banks in the 12 months
prior to each failure. Daily excess return for a bank
is defined as the daily return on the bank’s stock
minus the return on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
TOPIX index.
Source: Author’s calculations based on share
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Although there appears to be no signif-
icant share price reaction to announce-
ments of ratings downgrades, there is
a significant decline in the share pric-
es of banks in the two years prior to the
downgrade. The authors argue that
this is consistent with shareholders
providing market discipline that aug-
ments regulatory discipline.
Conclusion
The recent global financial crises il-
lustrate the importance of accurately
assessing risk in banking systems.
There is strong evidence that, given
the opportunity, market participants
provide useful information, and thus
can enhance the discipline imposed
by banking regulations and supervi-
sion. To the extent that investors are
exposed to losses and have the infor-
mation to evaluate banks, they can pro-
vide timely information to regulators
in an environment of rapid changes in
asset prices and risks faced by banks.
In recognition of the value of such
information, the regulatory frame-
work in developed countries has
been shifting over the last several years
from one of rigid command and con-
trol to one based on disciplinary in-
centives. Proposed changes in the
Basle Capital Accord, disclosure re-
quirements, and proposals requiring
banks to issue subordinated debt are
examples of the emphasis placed on
incentives and market discipline.7
In the last two years, Japanese regula-
tors also have taken steps in this di-
rection. They have allowed insolvent
institutions to fail. Perhaps more
importantly, although creditors of
failed institutions were protected
from major losses, shareholders were
not. Evidence reviewed in this article
indicates that shareholders of surviv-
ing banks responded to the changes
in the potential losses they faced.
Stricter disclosure rules and recon-
struction requirements for banks
receiving public funds have been
positive developments for effective
market discipline. Further changes
that promote market discipline, such
as exposing creditors with junior
claims to potential losses, taking
prompt corrective action against poor-
ly capitalized institutions, and resolv-
ing insolvent banks quickly and
efficiently, can help prevent and miti-
gate the economic cost of future crises.
—Hesna Genay
Economist
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3. Bank risk and stock returns
Notes: A bank is identified as having a “low” (“high”)
ratio if, in any given year, the bank has a ratio that is
below (above) the median value of the ratio for all
banks in that year.  Time period covered is fiscal
year 1990 through 1997. The risky loan ratio is the
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by the BIS capital rules.  Holding period returns are
defined as
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Sources: The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufactur-
ing Index (CFMMI) is a composite index of 16
industries, based on monthly hours worked and
kilowatt hours. IP represents the Federal Re-
serve Board’s Industrial Production Index for
the U.S. manufacturing sector. Autos and light
trucks are measured in annualized units, using
seasonal adjustments developed by the Board.
The purchasing managers’ survey data for the
Midwest are weighted averages of the seasonal-
ly adjusted production components from the
Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee Purchasing
Managers’ Association surveys, with assistance
from Bishop Associates, Comerica, and the
University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee.
Manufacturing output  indexes, 1992=100
Purchasing managers’ surveys:
net % reporting production growth
June Month  ago Year ago
MW 65.0 61.4 56.8
U.S. 63.0 59.2 50.7
Motor vehicle production
(millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
June Month  ago Year ago
Cars 5.6 5.5 4.8





May Month  ago Year ago
CFMMI 130.7 130.9 129.5
IP 138.6 138.1 135.4





Tracking Midwest manufacturing activity
The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufacturing Index (CFMMI) fell 0.1% from April
to May, to a seasonally adjusted level of 130.7 (1992=100). Revised data show
the index rose 0.5% in April. The Federal Reserve Board’s Industrial Production
Index for manufacturing (IP) increased 0.4% in May, the same rate experienced
in April. Light truck production increased from 7.2 million units in May to 7.3
million units in June. Car production also increased from 5.5 million units for
May to 5.6 million units for June.
The Midwest purchasing managers’ composite index (a weighted average of
the Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee surveys) for production increased to 65.0%
in June from 61.4% in May. The purchasing manager’s indexes increased for
all three indexes.  The national purchasing managers’ survey for production
increased from 59.2% to 63.0% from May to June.